01 · Worker
Credentialless and constrained
Run untrusted agent code without provider keys, general internet, Docker control or broad host mounts.

Runtime connections · review starting points
Five Docker-oriented starting points for running an AI agent worker while keeping credentials, action approval and external effects on the trusted customer side.
These examples are not qualified integrations. They preserve reviewable starting boundaries; they do not install a complete broker, prove containment or replace independent Linux testing. The nine reference Docker probes for Python 0.3.2 passed on 10 November 2026 in a builder-run Linux test (9 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped). This does not qualify these connection patterns; independent review remains pending.
01 · Worker
Run untrusted agent code without provider keys, general internet, Docker control or broad host mounts.
02 · Broker
A reviewed host service validates the frozen operation, obtains the workspace decision and holds the credentials.
03 · Effect
Only an allowed registered action may dispatch. Pending, denied, malformed or unavailable decisions must not execute.
Reference worker + host broker
A single disposable Linux host running the reference worker and a separately reviewed host broker.
The worker gets no route to the internet. Only the per-run broker directory crosses the container boundary; the host broker holds credentials and performs permitted effects.
Qualification limit: Compose starts the worker only. It does not install or qualify the broker, choose socket permissions, review images or prove containment. Build, push and pull the worker by manifest digest before using this file.
isolation-worker.Dockerfile
# Build with: docker build --build-arg BASE=repository@sha256:<64-hex-digest> .
ARG BASE
FROM ${BASE}
WORKDIR /opt/agent
COPY . /opt/agent
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir . && useradd --uid 10001 --create-home agent
USER 10001:10001
ENTRYPOINT ["python", "examples/isolated_agent.py"]compose.yaml
services:
worker:
image: ${WORKER:?Set a reviewed repository@sha256 worker digest}
network_mode: none
read_only: true
cap_drop: [ALL]
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
pids_limit: 128
mem_limit: 512m
cpus: 1.0
tmpfs:
- /tmp:size=64m,mode=1777
volumes:
# Dedicated per-run directory containing only the broker socket.
# Set host ownership/mode for worker UID 10001 and the broker first.
- ./run:/run/encased:rwReplace every example registry and digest with the exact reviewed artefact. Never paste credentials into a Dockerfile, build argument, image or evidence log.
Additional host-kernel boundary
A proposed runtime hardening trial on a supported disposable Linux host, after recording the baseline Docker run.
runsc interposes an application kernel between the worker and host. Encased remains responsible for action decisions; network-none and credential absence remain separate controls.
Qualification limit: This is not a qualified gVisor pairing. The command deliberately mounts no broker socket: gVisor host Unix-socket support needs a narrowly scoped reviewed exception and fresh tests before any broker exchange.
isolation-worker.Dockerfile
# Build with: docker build --build-arg BASE=repository@sha256:<64-hex-digest> .
ARG BASE
FROM ${BASE}
WORKDIR /opt/agent
COPY . /opt/agent
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir . && useradd --uid 10001 --create-home agent
USER 10001:10001
ENTRYPOINT ["python", "examples/isolated_agent.py"]Offline runsc review command
export WORKER='registry.example/encased-worker@sha256:REPLACE_WITH_REVIEWED_64_HEX_DIGEST'
docker run --rm --name encased-gvisor-review \
--runtime=runsc \
--network=none \
--read-only \
--cap-drop=ALL \
--security-opt=no-new-privileges \
--pids-limit=128 \
--memory=512m \
--cpus=1 \
--tmpfs /tmp:size=64m,mode=1777 \
"$WORKER"Replace every example registry and digest with the exact reviewed artefact. Never paste credentials into a Dockerfile, build argument, image or evidence log.
Remote sandbox evaluation
Evaluating a managed remote sandbox without placing provider credentials or the customer-side broker inside untrusted code.
E2B may isolate remote code execution; Encased action approval and broker effects must remain outside that sandbox. Internet and inbound access require their own explicit settings.
Qualification limit: No E2B integration or equivalence to Linux network-none is claimed. The reference local socket cannot cross to a separate customer host unchanged; request identity, replay refusal, cancellation and failure handling need a reviewed bridge.
isolation-worker.Dockerfile
# Build with: docker build --build-arg BASE=repository@sha256:<64-hex-digest> .
ARG BASE
FROM ${BASE}
WORKDIR /opt/agent
COPY . /opt/agent
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir . && useradd --uid 10001 --create-home agent
USER 10001:10001
ENTRYPOINT ["python", "examples/isolated_agent.py"]E2B review checklist — not executable configuration
# Build a custom sandbox template using E2B's current official workflow.
# Use the adjacent Dockerfile only as a starting point.
# Before any synthetic trial, verify and record:
# 1. Internet access is disabled in the actual sandbox settings.
# 2. Inbound access is restricted.
# 3. No provider, registry or broker credentials exist in the sandbox.
# 4. No local /run/encased/broker.sock is assumed to exist.
# 5. Any future broker bridge authenticates requests, binds action identity,
# refuses replays and fails closed on timeout or cancellation.Replace every example registry and digest with the exact reviewed artefact. Never paste credentials into a Dockerfile, build argument, image or evidence log.
Offline pod + default-deny policy
A cluster review environment where a platform engineer can verify admission, runtime, network policy and node boundaries.
The pod has no service-account token, host network, privileges or writable root filesystem. The accompanying policy denies pod traffic; no broker channel is opened by this example.
Qualification limit: A NetworkPolicy works only with an enforcing CNI and correct policy coverage. This offline pod has no broker exchange and is not a production deployment. Cluster, node, admission and image supply-chain controls need separate review.
isolation-worker.Dockerfile
# Build with: docker build --build-arg BASE=repository@sha256:<64-hex-digest> .
ARG BASE
FROM ${BASE}
WORKDIR /opt/agent
COPY . /opt/agent
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir . && useradd --uid 10001 --create-home agent
USER 10001:10001
ENTRYPOINT ["python", "examples/isolated_agent.py"]worker-pod.yaml — substitute WORKER with envsubst before applying
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: encased-worker-review
labels:
app: encased-worker-review
spec:
automountServiceAccountToken: false
hostNetwork: false
containers:
- name: worker
image: ${WORKER}
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 10001
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop: [ALL]
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
resources:
requests:
cpu: 250m
memory: 256Mi
limits:
cpu: "1"
memory: 512Mi
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: encased-worker-deny-all
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: encased-worker-review
policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]Replace every example registry and digest with the exact reviewed artefact. Never paste credentials into a Dockerfile, build argument, image or evidence log.
Per-run host-private broker channel
The reference single-host design, with a host-private broker and a fresh directory for each synthetic run.
The worker can request a typed registered operation through the per-run socket. It cannot run Docker, reach the host network or dispatch effects itself; the broker freezes, checks and performs allowed operations.
Qualification limit: The directory and broker are not created by this command. A reviewed setup must restrict access to the worker UID and broker, bind each request to its run and stop dispatch on errors, denial, timeout or pending review.
isolation-worker.Dockerfile
# Build with: docker build --build-arg BASE=repository@sha256:<64-hex-digest> .
ARG BASE
FROM ${BASE}
WORKDIR /opt/agent
COPY . /opt/agent
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir . && useradd --uid 10001 --create-home agent
USER 10001:10001
ENTRYPOINT ["python", "examples/isolated_agent.py"]Per-run local-socket worker command
export WORKER='registry.example/encased-worker@sha256:REPLACE_WITH_REVIEWED_64_HEX_DIGEST'
export ENCASED_RUN_DIR="$PWD/run"
install -d -m 700 "$ENCASED_RUN_DIR"
# First have the reviewed host-broker setup create broker.sock here and
# restrict this per-run directory to the broker and worker UID 10001.
docker run --rm --name encased-socket-review \
--network=none \
--read-only \
--cap-drop=ALL \
--security-opt=no-new-privileges \
--pids-limit=128 \
--memory=512m \
--cpus=1 \
--tmpfs /tmp:size=64m,mode=1777 \
--mount "type=bind,source=$ENCASED_RUN_DIR,target=/run/encased" \
"$WORKER"Replace every example registry and digest with the exact reviewed artefact. Never paste credentials into a Dockerfile, build argument, image or evidence log.
Next step
Start with the unmodified reference run on a disposable Ubuntu host. Preserve raw logs, exit codes, package hashes and repository manifest digests. A passing author-run suite is useful evidence, not independent approval or production certification.